Abstract
In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian attacks in the presence of this excess noise. Article not available.
© 2007 Optical Society of America
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