Abstract

In this paper, the security of an optical cryptosystem based on double random phase encoding (DRPE) with perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is analyzed for a particular session. In the cryptosystem, the PFS strategy is utilized to enhance the security and key management of the traditional DRPE scheme. Our analysis reveals that the use of PFS has certain advantages in the key management approach, but the method is still vulnerable against modified plaintext attacks when the attack is performed in the same session. Also, it is noted that the method is safe against conventional plaintext attacks, but it is vulnerable to the modified chosen and known plaintext attacks. The original plaintext can be easily retrieved with the proposed attack algorithms. Numerical simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed attack algorithms.

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